Some questions to Maurizio Vezzosi about Contemporary challeng | Maurizio Vezzosi

Some questions to Maurizio Vezzosi about Contemporary challenges in Russian foreign policy in Middle East by Vision & Global Trends - International Institute for Global Analyses.

How important is the Middle East for Moscow from a geostrategic point of view?

It's crucial. Russian presence and influence is actually a key-factor for the security and stability of the Mashrek, the Magreb and, logically, for the connected areas (as Sahel). Considering the potentials threats coming from South, for Moscow the Caucasus is an indispensable security belt. Moscow has made every necessary effort to preserve – and increase – its presence in Syria: to have a solid presence in the M.E. gives Moscow access to the warm seas, such as the Mediterranean. Europeans countries, especially the Southern ones, should fully consider Russia as a Mediterranean power.

To what extent has or will the pandemic crisis have a negative impact on Putin's geopolitical and geo-economic objectives in the Middle East?

In general, Russia's domestic economy suffered less pandemic consequences than the Western European countries. The Russian - state-led - pharmaceutical industry had powerful growth with the anti-Covid 19 research and production. After some months of uncertainty in 2020, the oil and gas price levels are actually positive for Moscow. One of the main markets for Russian exports in the M.E. is the defence one: this market is not expected to be impacted in a negative way by the pandemic crisis. In summary, Kremlin's geo-politic towards the M.E. appears solid enough to be not put in crisis by any potential new pandemic shocks.

How is the Russian foreign agenda affected (if it will be affected) by the increasing Chinese presence in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf area? And what about American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the recent dramatic developments? Despite the intention not to legalise the Taliban, indeed, Putin seems willing to conclude new agreements and accords with the newly born Islamic Emirate.

It's not possible to exclude some contrasts in the Russian-Chinese relations, in the M.E.'s affairs as well. But at the same time we should keep in mind that Moscow and Beijing are attached by a strategic connection. So neither Russia nor China are going to put in crisis their strategic security by reacting to some occasional frictions between them. Afghanistan is a high-level potential threat for Moscow: for this reason the Kremlin have to find its security guarantees building agreements with the Taliban, and with Pakistan as well. The Taliban actually see Russia as an important interlocutor and also see China as one. Washington and London are clearly unhappy with that, and they would like to change the Taliban's attitude: it's consequently very difficult to imagine a peaceful and stable scenario in Afghanistan within the short or medium-term.

Will there be changes in 2024 once Putin finishes his presidential term? If Putin decides not to run again, is there a possibility that he will follow the same path as the former Kazakhstan's President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, by ruling the country’s Security Council, continuing to shape Russian foreign policy?

Relevant social and political changes are already ongoing in the Russian Federation: millions of Russians are unsatisfied with their social conditions and their life's perspective, especially in some regions of the Federation: according to social research by the Levada Center the majority of Russians want a return to a state-led economy as well as an increase in public investment.
The Duma's elections in September confirmed this social orientation: probably, this element is going to affect even the post-Putin transition and its developments.
Likely, the Vladimir Vladimirovich era will not end in one act, but it will be a gradual process: a “Kazakh scenario” is among the possibilities for Moscow. The same is true for Minsk.

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